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Short abstract (25-30 words): 
Security awareness and education are frequently overlooked or provided in a one-
size-fits-all approach.  A more personalised approach is advocated, tailored towards 
the individual’s circumstances and needs of the staff concerned. 
 
Long abstract (120 words): 
Lack of security awareness, training and education is a contributing factor to many 
security breaches, but these aspects continue to receive insufficient attention in 
practice. Many organisations still do nothing at all, while others rely upon one-size-
fits-all solutions that are unlikely to influence all staff in a uniform manner.  This 
discussion advocates the value of tailoring security awareness to individual needs, 
taking account of factors such as the individual’s role, prior knowledge, learning style, 
and perception of security as a basis for devising personalised awareness, training 
and education that targets recipients more specifically.  The concept is illustrated by 
showing how the topic of password security could be framed in different ways to suit 
learners of different types. 
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It is now readily recognised that cybersecurity is not just a technical 
issue, with many breaches highlighting insufficient attention towards 
human aspects.  One of the fundamental reasons for this is that 
people are not naturally equipped with the skills, instincts and 
behaviours required to ensure appropriate protection, and so need 
support in order to help them understand what they should be doing 
and learn how to do it.  However, looking at the evidence from 
various surveys over the years, it becomes clear that security 
awareness, training and education often hold the curious distinction 
of being overlooked as key controls, while the lack of provision is 
readily recognised as a key cause of incidents.  As such, this remains 
an area in which more could be done, and how it is done could 
arguably be improved. 
While the terms are often used interchangeably, awareness, training and 
education have distinct meanings and contribute towards different phases of a 
learning continuum.  Prior work from NIST dating back to 1998 distinguishes their 
use in a security context as follows [1]: 
• Awareness:  To focus attention on security. 
• Training: To produce relevant and needed security skills and competency. 
• Education:  To integrate all (security skills and competencies) into a common body of 
knowledge, adding a multidisciplinary study of concepts, issues, and principles. 
.To an extent, whatever we call it is somewhat academic in the first instance, 
because current evidence suggests that we are not doing enough of it, and what is 
being done may not be delivering the desired results.   The discussion here begins by 
presenting evidence to support the first point, before proceeding to consider how 
organisations that wish to take security awareness more seriously might consider a 
more targeted and tailored approach for their staff. 
 
Cyber insecurity - Unaware, untrained and uneducated? 
As an indication of the current lack of provision, we can look at the findings from the 
2017 Cyber Security Breaches Survey [2] in the UK, and in particular the extent to 
which organisations reported the provision of security-related training for their staff.  
Considering respondents of all sizes (from micro firms through to large organisations) 
only 20% of the 1,523 businesses surveyed reported that their staff had received cyber 
security training the last 12 months.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the picture was best 
amongst the 175 large firms, where 63% responded positively.  However, there is also 
the question of what qualified as training and who was exposed to it.  The definition 
of ‘training’ here included attending internal or external training, or attending 
seminars or conferences on cyber security.  The inclusion of the latter possibly 
explains why IT staff were dominant amongst those reported as recipients (with 79% 
of those in large organisations being claimed to have received training).   Meanwhile, 
the proportion of other staff (i.e. those that are not cyber security or IT specialists) 
receiving training was a meagre 29%.  So, many organisations fail to provide training 
at all, and even those that do often fail to extend it to the general populous that might 
benefit from it. 
Given that these particular findings are from the UK, it is worth noting that 
‘User Education and Awareness’ is one of the UK National Cyber Security Centre’s 
10 Steps to Cyber Security (which have been advocated to UK businesses since 2012).  
To quote from the summary, this step is described as follows: 
“Users have a critical role to play in their organisation’s security and so it's 
important that security rules and the technology provided enable users to do their 
job as well as help keep the organisation secure. This can be supported by a 
systematic delivery of awareness programmes and training that deliver security 
expertise as well helping to establish a security-conscious culture.” [3] 
As with all of the 10 Steps, achieving this could actually represent more of a 
leap than a step, depending upon how an organisation is initially positioned, and it is 
interesting to note the degree to which it is achieved in practice.  Referring again to 
the Cyber Security Breaches Survey, another question specifically polled the degree 
to which respondents considered themselves to be complying with each of the 10 
Steps.  The findings are depicted in Figure 1, with the Steps listed from left to right in 
order of the highest to lowest level of compliance in the most recent survey results.   
As can be seen, while education and awareness has seen a marginal (perhaps 
negligible) increase, it is still dwarfed the levels of compliance seen for more 
technical controls.  
 
 
Figure 1 :  Compliance with the 10 Steps to Cyber Security 
 
Given that all of the 10 Steps are actually related to baseline security, the picture 
across the board should ideally be healthier than this, but for the purposes of the 
current discussion the key point is that less than a third of respondents consider 
themselves compliant with activities around awareness-raising, and generally tend to 
be overlooking it despite clearly giving attention towards other aspects of security.  
Such a finding raises the question of whether it does not receive attention because it 
actually does not need to.  However, looking at further results from the same survey 
revealed that almost a fifth of respondents believed that the factors behind the 
breaches they experienced were staff lacking awareness or knowledge (7%) or human 
error (11%).  Added to this, 42% of respondents were unsure of the contributing 
factors, so there could conceivably have been more cases hidden amongst these in 
which awareness and education could have been relevant to help.  
 
Going beyond the UK and taking a broader view of the issue, Figure 2 draws upon 
EY’s Global Information Security Survey (GISS) series, and clearly shows evidence 
that lack of awareness consistently contributes to the most highly-rated area of 
vulnerability [4].  
 
 
Figure 2 :  Top-rated vulnerabilities 2013-2016 
 
The 2016 survey asked respondents about the main risks associated with the use 
of mobile devices within the organisation, and by far and away the most significant 
problem was deemed to be ‘Poor use awareness/behaviour’, with 73% of respondents 
citing it (ahead of 50% and 32% indicating loss of a device and device hijacking, 
which were the second and third most-cited issues).  
 
Misdirecting our efforts? 
It is clear from the above that the results collectively suggest an awareness-
related problem.  This in turn prompts the question of what organisations are doing in 
response.  Looking at examples of the GISS surveys from 2010 to date, Figure 3 
shows whether the respondents expected to be adjusting their spending on security 
awareness and training in the year ahead.  It is notable that the 2016 survey is the only 
case in which the largest proportion of respondents intend to spend more on the issue 
rather than for their expenditure to remain the same.  It also made it the top-ranked 
area for additional spending amongst the 27 areas of security listed in the survey.  
Aligning with this, 55% of the respondents flagged it the area as high priority for the 
next 12 months (making it the third highest ranked issue, behind business continuity 
and data leakage prevention).  Moreover, only 7% ranked it as a low priority – 
apparently making it the least likely area of security to be seen as low priority.  
 
 
Figure 3 :  Planned level of spending on Security Awareness and Training 
 
It may be increasing, but this leaves the question of whether the spending is 
effective.  Even in the prior years, approximately 40% of respondents were claiming 
they would be spending more, but it does not appear to have had any tangible effect 
upon the problem posed by unaware employees (which Figure 2 has already shown to 
have been fairly static over the most recent 4-year period, and remains the most acute 
area of vulnerability).  So, assuming that some organisations actually did spent more 
(and that some who spent more in the past then continued to spend the same), why has 
the situation not improved?  Certainly, some commentators have directly dismissed 
putting efforts and resources towards security awareness as “a waste of time” [5].  
This is clearly a harsh view, and to be honest can be easily disproved in certain 
contexts.  For example, prior work in terms of assessing password practices has 
clearly demonstrated that users’ selections become demonstrably better if they are 
provided with guidance to support their choices (with a 30% decrease in explicitly 
weak passwords being observed simply by providing on-screen guidance) [6].  This 
helps to illustrate that some users will respond positively if they are given some 
indication of what they are supposed to be doing.    
Nonetheless, a view also prevails that no matter how much training you throw at 
them, some staff can still end up doing the same things wrong.  As a result, one can 
easily end up feeling like the frustrated hotelier Basil Fawlty attempting to hold a fire 
drill (which, if you are unfamiliar with the comedy scenario, ends with the sentiment 
“I don't know why we bother, we should let you all burn...").  But this does not really 
serve to help anyone, and unlike the fire scenario – where it would be Basil’s guests 
that perished if they didn’t pay attention – in the security awareness context it is still 
the organisation that ends up paying the price if its staff fail to get on board.   
So, to answer the question posed in the paper title, we should not just let our 
staff burn, and perhaps a different approach is needed in order to get their attention 
and buy-in.  In this sense, it is worth recognising that many current attempts at 
awareness-raising are implicitly based upon an assumption of one-size-fits-all.  The 
extent to which it works, however, will very much depend upon the extent to which 
the chosen approach happens to match the needs of the audience receiving it.  Even in 
the best case, there are likely to be some people that are not reached as effectively as 
others, and it would be preferable to consider ways in which efforts could be more 
usefully tailored to the needs of the recipients.  In short, the focus here is not 
concerned with what staff need to know, but rather how we can get them to know it.   
 
Personalising Security Awareness, Training and Education 
The idea of improving and targeting security awareness is by no means a new one.  
Prior works have suggested the use of various psychological triggers, such as fear 
appeals [7], shaming [8] and emphasis of personal benefits, some of which doubtless 
have the likelihood of hitting the target for some people.  However, looking beyond 
such attempts to leverage human nature, there is potentially a lot to be learned from 
broader fields such as education, marketing and communications. 
The key argument here is that security is more likely to be accepted and acted 
upon if staff feel the message is directed specifically and appropriately at them rather 
than generically at everyone.  Not only does the latter approach fail to tailor the 
message to individual circumstances and needs, but it also has the potential to create 
an implicit impression that security can be someone else’s problem (or at least no 
more particularly my responsibility than anyone else’s).  At present, any tailoring of 
security awareness materials is often, at best, done from the perspective of framing 
the messages to match the type of organisation or sector concerned (e.g. talking about 
patient data in hospitals versus customer data in banks).  It is rare to see anything 
getting down to the level of what each user might actually need based on their 
learning style or prior predisposition towards security. 
There are, however, various ways in which messages and materials can be 
framed and communicated to achieve better effect.  For example, one might consider 
the effect of push or pull styles of influencing, depending upon the perceived 
predisposition of the staff concerned.  Push approaches basically seek to tell people 
what to do, and are based around techniques such as reward and punishment, and 
assertive persuasion, whereas pull-based methods are geared towards encouraging 
them what to do, with methods based around participation and trust, and 
establishment of a common vision.  Indeed, prior work has considered how these 
might be applied in the context of promoting security and policy compliance [9]. 
With the above in mind, Figure 4 compares traditional style of security 
awareness, training and education (where basically the same provision is pushed out 
to everyone), with a personalised approach that is arguably more desirable [10].  This 
personalisation attempts to take factors that relate to the individual who is the 
intended target of education, with a view to tailoring the provision more closely to 
their needs, preferences and perceptions.  As shown in the figure, a number of factors 
could be usefully employed here: 
• Role: This relates to what someone does in terms of the responsibilities they hold, and data and 
systems they use. 
• Prior knowledge: Encompassing aspects such as what someone already knows about security, 
the organisation’s policy, and their technology literacy, all of which may affect their 
understanding of, and response to, awareness and education efforts. 
• Barriers: This refers to barriers to being able to apply knowledge, such as personal and 
cultural values that could potentially stop knowledge to be absorbed and applied. 
• Learning Style:   Recognising that people learn in different ways (e.g. the VARK - Visual, 
Aural, Read/write and Kinaesthetic - model reflects four sensory modalities that may be used 
for learning information [11]), and so presenting the materials in a manner that suit an 
individual’s preference may deliver better results.  
• Security perception:  This essentially reflects the individual’s attitude towards security.  For 
example, are they already compliant with policy or tending toward disobedience?  Are they 
risk-tolerant or risk-averse?  Are they accepting of security or resistant towards it? 
 
Figure 4 :  Contrasting typical and desirable provision of security awareness, 
training and education 
 
All of the above could be put into one category named attitude.  We need to 
research and identify each individual’s positive and negative feelings and factors 
towards understanding and applying security awareness. When the above are put 
together we can then have a full picture of someone’s attitude and design a training 
session accordingly. When planning training we need to take into account all the 
possible types of learners that could attend, their potential understanding of the 
problem and, through the training, be able to inform and (where necessary) convince 
the participants about the importance of the issues. When giving out instructions, we 
need to ensure there has been some level of reflection in defining the types of users 
participating and the training session to be designed in an inclusive way. The delivery 
of the training should be seen as an intervention to the different types of learners that 
could attend and ensuring that all participants can engage. Participant engagement can 
be seen in many ways. Activities and instructions should be seen in a facilitative way 
in order to be seen not as a one-off session, but as an ongoing need for the individuals 
and the organisation.  
In terms of how this may look in practice, Table 1 contrasts how the topic of 
password education might be personalised for two different staff members according 
to the sort of characteristics outlined above.  This clearly requires more effort to 
engineer in the first instance, but is likely to deliver better results in terms of reaching 
and educating the individuals concerned. 
 
User Characteristics Implications Personal Plan 
A 
• Departmental Manager, 
with access to HR, 
Finance and other 
Has access to highly 
sensitive systems, and 
• Push-based 
influencing 
corporate information 
systems  
• Visual learner 
• IT-literate, but does not 
see the point in 
security, and so 
inclined to disregard or 
resist it  
• Has previous incidents 
of lax password 
practice 
so clearly needs to use 
passwords appropriately 
 
Personal plan needs to 
combine elements of 
trying to bring them on-
side along with clear 
message that they are 
expected and required to 
do it right 
 
• Use an awareness 
video, appealing to the 
user’s sense of 
humour and pushing 
the security message 
more softly  
• Support this with 
assertive persuasion  
• Ensure and 
emphasise awareness 
of sanctions for bad 
practice 
• Assist/nudge towards 
good practice by 
providing a password 
meter 
 
B 
• Sales executive, 
routinely accessing 
client and product 
databases on mobile 
devices while away 
from base. 
• Kinaesthetic learner 
• Accepting of security 
but lacking 
understanding of 
passwords and what 
passwords strength 
means 
• Not overly IT-literate, 
and so tends to learn 
tasks and operations 
by rote on each specific 
system 
Will not need to be 
convinced to use 
passwords, but will need 
to be helped to 
understand how to do it 
properly. 
 
• Pull-based influencing 
• Emphasis upon 
supporting the 
organisation and 
colleagues via good 
password practice 
• Provide clear 
description of 
password rules and 
system-specific 
instructions on how to 
do it  
• Provide a means for 
the user to practice 
password selection 
• Guide via Informative 
feedback from 
password meter 
 
Table 1 :  An example of tailoring security education to individual circumstances 
 
Conclusions 
It is clear from the evidence that security awareness and education is still an area in 
which many organisations are lacking, and are suffering as a consequence.  Of course, 
no approach is going to represent a silver bullet, and some staff will remain resolutely 
resistant to any approaches to educate them or raise their awareness.  For others, 
however, making an attempt to tailor towards their needs has the potential to increase 
their buy-in and understanding.   The proposed approach of tailoring the provision is, 
of course, a non-trivial step, given than many are still lagging behind even in 
traditional provision.  However, this is not a reason to disregard it, and if 
organisations are starting from a low base then it may be better to aim straight 
towards something that is more personalised and inclusive from the outset.   
Moreover, leveraging alternative education strategies and approaches can 
potentially be taken further.  For example, one area in which the authors have been 
active in computing and wider STEM education is Peer Learning.  This could be 
applied in a security context by creating teams of people who would then support each 
other in improving security awareness and a higher level of resulting compliance.  So 
far from just leaving people to burn as a result of their own ignorance, there are 
actually many further opportunities to explore to help them avoid the fire in the first 
place. 
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